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CoNSTITOTIONAL LA.w-CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE-SucCESsIVE STATE PR.oSE-

cunoNs FOR SAME ACTIVITY-Petitioner. suspected of having robbed five
persons on a sihgle occasion. was indicted and tried for the robbery of
three of them. His sole defense was alibi and he was acquitted when only
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one of the five victims identified him as the robber. Petitioner was then
tried under an indictment for the robbery of a fourth victim. Petitioner
interposed the same defense but was convicted at this second trial. The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. On certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting.1 Neither the
successive trials nor the failure of the court to apply the doctrine of
collateral estoppel to the facts of this case constituted a deprivation
of petitioner's liberty without due process of law. Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464 (1958).2
The circumstances of the principal case raise interesting questions
regarding the protection to be afforded defendants in successive prosecutions for the same allegedly criminal conduct. There are three main defenses to such prosecutions: double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and due
process· of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jeopardy attaches when a
jury·is impaneled to try the accused on a valid indictment or information
before a court of competent jurisdiction,3 and the double jeopardy safeguard is designed to prevent a second prosecution for the same offense. 4
Double jeopardy frequently fails to provide adequate protection against
harassment by successive prosecutions, however, because of the narrow
meaning given the phrase "same offense."5 In a majority of states the
offenses charged are not the same unless the facts alleged in the second
indictment, if given in evidence, would have supported a conviction on

l Chief Justice Warren dissented on the ground that due process includes collateral
~toppel and the trial court improperly refused to apply the doctrine. Justice Douglas,
with Justice Black concurring, dissented on the basis of Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184 (1957), apparently viewing that case as establishing a "same transaction" definition
of "same offense" for purposes of double jeopardy. In this connection it should be remembered that Justices Black and Douglas have supported the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Fifth Amendment. See their dissenting opinion in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68 (1947).
·
2 In a companion case petitioner was charged in four separate indictments with
the murder of his wife and three children, all of whom were found in a burning building
with bullet wounds in their .heads. In three successive trials petitioner was convicted of
first degree murder of his wife and two of the children respectively. In the first two trials
the penalty imposed was imprisonment while in the third the penalty was death. The
Court upheld this third conviction, four justices dissenting (including Justice Brennan
who had disqualified himself in the Hoag case), despite the fact that evidence of all four
deaths was allowed to go to the jury over petitioner's objections in each of the trials.
The Court relied on the reasoning of the Hoag case. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
3 McCarthy v. Zerbst, (10th Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 640, cert. den. 299 U.S. 610 (1936);
People ex rel. Meyer v. Warden, 269 N.Y. 426, 199 N.E. 647 (1936).
4 The double jeopardy provisions of most state constitutions are similar to the federal
provision, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. CONST., Amend. V. New Jersey's provision, involved in the principal
case, is substantially different. "No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same
offense." N.J. CONST., Art. I, 1[11.
5 See generally Kirchheimer, "The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy," 58 YALE
L. J. 513 (1949).
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the first indictment, 6 or unless the same evidence would sustain a conviction in each case.7 By charging the accused with a theoretically different
offense a prosecutor can frequently avoid the prohibition against a second
trial. 8 A few courts apply double jeopardy whenever the offenses charged
result from a single transaction or act. 9 Properly applied this test could
provide real protection against harassment but the same courts have
narrowed this concept to the point where the robbery of two persons at
the same time, for example, constitutes two different acts. 10 This·approach,
taken by the state courts in the instant case, 11 was accepted by the
Supreme Court as removing petitioner's claim of double jeopardy from
application. Collateral estoppel, which can arise only after a valid final
judgment,12 prevents relitigation of issues already determined. 13 This
aspect of the doctrine of res judicata is generally accepted as applicable in
criminal proceedings by most jurisdictions that have faced the issue. 14
Yet it provides little practical help to a defendant because of the difficulty
in determining what issues were in fact resolved by a prior general verdict
of not guilty or guilty of a lesser included offense. In federal prosecutions
this is a determination of law made by the judge after examining the
record in the first trial.15 This procedure was accepted by the court
below in the principal case but the trial judge was unable to determine
what issues had actually been decided by the jury despite the fact that
petitioner's sole defense in the first trial had been alibi.16 The majority
of the Supreme Court refused to upset this ruling and thus held collateral
estoppel inapplicable as a defense. The criminal defendant's last hope
against harassment is to invoke the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which protects against an attempt "to wear the accused out
by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials." 17 Apparently no case,

6 Rex v. Vandercomb and Abbott, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796); State v.
Roberts, 152 La. 283, 93 S. 95 (1922); State v. McGaughey, 45 S.D. 379, 187 N.W. 717 (1922).
7 Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915); Duvall v. State, Ill Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E.
90 (1924); State v. Magone, 33 Ore. 570, 56 P. 648 (1899).
s See Lugar, "Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata," 39 IowA L. REv.
317 (1954).
9 State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (1833); State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474, 106 A. 416
(1919); Spannell v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. Rep. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918).
10 State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A. (2d) 628 (1956). See also Thompson v. State, 90
Tex. Crim. Rep. 222, 234 S.W. 400 (1921).
11 State v. Hoag, note IO supra.
12 JUDGMENTS RE5TATEMENT §50 (1942).
13 JUDGMENTS REsTATEll!ENT §45(c) (1942).
14 Regina v. Miles, 24 Q.B.D. 423 (1890); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85
(1916); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); comment, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 231 at
239 (1948).
15 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951). This case involved use of a criminal prosecution as an estoppel in a subsequent civil suit against the
defendant but the problem presented was the same as that here considered.
16 State v. Hoag, note 10 supra.
17 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 328 (1937).

412

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 57

however, has been found to exceed this broad limitation. The question
may then be raised concerning the extent to which the vague due process
standard of fundamental fairness might be applied by reference to the
more precise safeguards of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The
Court has already indicated that subjection to double jeopardy is not
necessarily a violation of due process.18 It has here expressed "grave
doubts" whether collateral estoppel is a constitutional requirement.19
Consequently, and in light of a companion case in which the defendant
was permitted to be tried three times for his life,20 it would appear that
the constitutional protection of due process may be of only slight practical
significance to defendants confronted with this type situation.21 It is thus
left for the states themselves, through remedial legislation, to deal with
the problem presented22 or else leave their citizens open to successive
prosecutions for the same criminal activity.
Robert L. Bombaugh

18 Palko v. Connecticut, note 17 supra; Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
The holding of the principal case that successive prosecutions for different offenses arising
out of the same occurrence is not fundamentally unfair is thus not surprising.
10 Principal case at 471.
20 Ciucci v. Illinois, note 2 supra.
21 The fact that defendant in the Ciucci case was charged with a capital offense would
seem to eliminate any possible argument that the Court might modify its position depending on the nature of the crime involved.
22 For an example of one suggested statutory change, see American Law Institute,
MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, §1.08 (1956).

